Queen's Bench Division Before the LoRD CHIF JusnCE, MR. JUSTICE ASHWORTH, and MR. JUSncE ELvES The DxvIsIoNAL COuRT dismissed an appeal by the prosecutor against the dis- missal by Bristol justices of an informa- tion preferred against Mr. James Charles Bell alleging that on October 26, 1959, at The Arcade, Broadmead, Bristol, he unlawfully did offer for sale a knife which had a blade which opened automatically by hand pressure applied to a device attached to the handle of the knife, contrary to section I of the Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act. 1959. Section I (1) of the Act provides: "Any Person who manufactures, sells or hires or offers for sale or hire. or lends or gives to any other'person (a) any knife which has a blade which opens automatically by hand pressure . . . attached to the handle of the knife, sometimes known as a " flick knifo' or 'flick gun' . . shall be guilty of an offence . . . Mr. J. A. Cox appeared for the prose- cutor; Mr. Paul Chadd for the defendant JUDGMENT The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE said that the justices. without deciding whether the knife was a knife of the sort set out in the statute, dismissed the information on the ground that there had been no offer for sale. The short facts were that the defen- danrt kept a retail shop in Bristol. On the day in question a Police constable walking past the shop saw in the window amongst other articles one of these knives. Behind it was a ticket with the words "Ejector knife, 4s.". The police officer went in and informed the defendant that he would be reported for offering for sale the knife and the defendant replied " Fair enough ". The sole question was whether that knife in the shop window with the ticket behind it constituted an offer for sale within the statute. His Lordship confessed that when he first read these papers he was inclined to the view that to say that a knife dis- played in a window like that, with the price attached to it, was not an offer for sale, was just nonsense. It was there inviting people to buy it, but any statute must ol course be looked at in the light of the general law of the country and Parliament, in its wisdom in passing an Act, must be taken to have known how the law had inter- preted certain words. It was clear that according to the ordinary law of contract the display of an article with the price upon it in a shop window was merely an invitation to treat, not an offer for sale, the acceptance of which constituted a contract. That was the general law of the country. Not only that, but it was to be observed that in many statutes and orders which Prohibited seling and offering goods for sale it was very common to insert the words " offering and exposing for sale " the words "exposing for sale" covering the display of goods in shop windows. In several statutes, two of which had been cited to the Court, Parliament, when it desired to enlarge the ordinary meaning of those words, included a definition section enlarging the ordinary meaning of " offer for sale " to cover other matters, including the exposing of goods for sale with the price attached. In those circumstances his Lordship had been reluctantly driven to the conclusion that no offence was here committed. CASUS OMISSUS? At firt sight it sounded absurd that knives of this sort could not be manufac- tured, sold, hired, lent or given, but could be displayed in shop windows, but, even if this were a casus omissus, it was not for the Court to supply the omission: His Lordship bore in mind the strong words of Lord Simonds in Magor and St. Mellons Rural District Council v. Newport Cor- poration ([1952] A.C.189). In, that case one of the Lords Justices in the Court of Appeal had said that the Court, having discovered the supposed intention of Parlia- iment, must proceed to fill in the gaps. "What the legislature had not written the Court must write ". In answer to that con- tention Lord Simonds had said that that appeared to him to be a naked usurpation of the legislative function under the thin guise of interpretation. His Lordship found it, quite apart from authority, quite inpos- sible to say that the exhibition of goods in a shop window was in itself an offer for Sale4 Accordingly he had come to the con- clusion that the justices were right and the appeal would be dismissed. MR. JUSTICE AsHwoRTI and MR. JUSTICE ELWES agreed. Solicitors.-Messr. Robins, Hay & Waters, for Town Clerk, Bristol; Messrs. Haslewoods, for Messrs. Cooke, Painter, Spofforth & Co., Bristol. QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION NO NAKED USURPATION FISHER V. BELL