House Of Lords Law Report, May 10 Before LoRD PoaTmx, LoRD NoRmAND, LORt OAKsEY, LORD REID and LORD RADCLIFFE. The HOUSE allowed the appeal of the defend- ants from the decision of the Court of Appeal (Lord Justice Singleton and Lord Justice Jenkins, Lord Justice Somervell dissenting) allowing the appeal of the plaintiff, Miss Bessie Stone, from the decision of Mr. Justice Oliver at Manchester Assizes in favour of the defendI ants, whom sbe sued on behalf of themselves and all the other members of the Cheetham Cricket Club. On August 9, 1947, Miss Stone was injured by a cricket ball while she was standing on th highway outside her house, No. 10, Beckenham Road, Cheetham Hill. The ball was hit by a batsman playing in a match on the Cheetham cricket ground adjacent. He was not sued. The club had been in existence, and matches had been regularly played on that ground. since about 1864. In 1910 Beckenham Road was built up. The ground was protected by a fence 7ft. high, the top of the fence being 17ft. above the cricket pitch. The distance from the batsman to the fence was about 78 yards, and to the placbe where Miss Stone was hit just under 100 yards. The hit was quite exceptional, and according to the evidence a baUl was very rarely hit over the fence during a match. Miss Stone claimed in negligence and, alternatively, in nuisance. Mr. Justice Oliver acquitted the defendants of negligence and held that nuisance was not established. Miss Stone appealed, and the Court of Appeal reversed his decision, holding that a public nuisance was not established, but that the defendants, knowing that balls had been hit over the fence, owed a duty to take reason- able care to prevent injury to the users of the highway, and that they had failed to exercise the care which the circumstances demanded and were liable in damages for negligence. The defendants appealed to the House of Lords. Sir Walter Monckton, K.C., and Mr. Wv A. Sime appeared for the appellants; Mr. H. 1. Nelson, K.C., Mr. Henry Burton, and Mr. F. L. Clark for the respondents. JUDGMENT LORD PORTER said that the plaintiff con- tended that the defendants were negligent or guilty of creating a nuisance in failing to take any sufficient precautions to prevent the escape of cricket baDs from the ground and the consequent risk of injury to persons in the road. In her submission it was enough that a ball had been driven into the road even once; such an event gave'the defendants waning that a ball might be hit into the road and. knowing that, they must, as reasonable men, also know that an injury was likely to be caused to anyone standing in the road or to a passer-by. The argument was strengthened by the fact that a ball had been driven over the fence from time to time even though at somewhat remote intervals. Sucb an event was known to the appellants to have occurred and, if they had considered the matter, they ought, she contended, to have envisaged 'The possibility of its repetition. But the question remained: Was it enough to make an action negligent to say that its performance might possibly cause injury, or must some greater probability exist of that result ensuing in order to make those respon- sible for its occurrence guilty of negligence ? In this case the defendants did not do the act themselves, but they were the trustees of a field where cricket was played, were in control of it, and invited visiting teams to play there. They were, therefore, responsible for the negligent action of those who used the field in the way intended that it should be used. The question then arose: What degree of care must they exercise to escape liability for anything which might occur as a result of the intended use of the field ? They knew that the hitting of a ball out of the ground was possible, and therefore that it was possible that someone might be hit by it. Flying or motor-car acci- dents presupposed the happening of an event which the flyer or driver wished to do every- thing possible to avoid, whereas the hitting of a ball out of the ground was an incident in the game, and, indeed, one which the batsmen would wish to bring about. But for the act to be negligent there must not only be a reasonable possibility of its happening, but also of injury being caused. " You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour ": per Lord Atkin in Donoghue v. Stevenson (48 The Times L.R. 494, at p. 499; [19321 A.C. 562, at p. 580). It was not enough that the event was such as could reasonably be foreseen; the further result that injury was likely to follow must also be such as a reasonable man would contemplate before he could be found guilty of actionable negligence. The mere possibility of injury was not enough; the existence of some risk was an ordinary incident of life even when all due care had beeni, is it must be, taken. TWO DIFFERENT STANDARDS There were two different standards to be applied: (I) whether the facts relied on were evidence from which negligence could in law be inferred; (2) whether, if negligence could be inferred, those facts did constitute negli- gence. Both to some extent, but more particu- larly the latter, depended on the surrounding circumstances. Here the Judge held that a reasonable man would not anticipate that injury would be likely to result from cricket being played in the field and the conclusion was not unwarranted, although the defendants knew that balls had been hit out of the ground and a repetition might at some time be anticipated. No help was to be found in the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Where, as in the present case, all the facts relating to the cause of the acci- dent were known, the doctrine could not have any application. It was known exactly how the accident happened, and it was unnecessary to ask whether it would have hapPened had there been no negligence. The only question was: D)id the facts or omissions which were known and which led up to the injury amount to negligence ? A reasonable man would not have anticipated injury. The alternative claim based on nuisance need not be discussed since it was admitted that in, the circumstances of this case nuisance could not be established unless negligence was proved. The appeal should be allowed. The other noble and learned LORDS also delivered opinions in favour of allowing the appeal. Solicitors.-Messrs. Hall, Bryden, Harvey and Egerton; Messrs. L. Binham and Co., for Messrs. Linder, Myers and Pariser, Man- chester. HOUSE OF LORDS INJURY FROM CRICKET BALL: DEFENDANTS' APPEAL ALLOWEI) BOLTON AND OTHERS v. STONE