The Symbol Of Stalingrad From Our Diplomatic Correspondent None of the allies, nor even the Russians themselves, can tell yet how much they owe to Stalingrad. Some of the evidence is still lacking. How much the battle has cost Germany, how many Germans have been killed and maimed, and how great has been the strain and drain on German industry and transport-that part of the ledger is covered. But already the net gains to the allies are shiningly clear. The enemy has been forced to spend himself, almost at a standstill, during- the two months which friend and foe alike agreed in calling the grand climax of the war. In August the Germans considered their plans fool-proof. Stalingrad would fall in a few days, leaving them plenty of time to launch much larger campaigns, down against the Caucasus or up against Moscow before the accursed winter set in; Russia would be as good as finished, Europe would be an impenetrable fortress, and the war would be theirs, except for the last assault on the British aircraft carrier. The plan was so clear-how could it go wrong ?-that they came to think of Stalingrad not simply as an obstacle to be cleared away but as a symbol of vic- tory. The first flames from the white flats and factories were greeted in the Reich as beacons proclaiming the quite certain end of fighting in the cast. Now, instead, it is another kind of symbol; it is what the Germans call in their hideous phrase a Knlzochemzij/iile, a bone mill; a symbol of war that has engulfed their plans. A PEOPLE'S DEFENCE All peoples of the world, even the Germans, acknowlcdge that never have the Russian men and boys fought better, never more gloriously, than during these two months. Their stand may have saved the war for the allies. Thev certainlv have given Russia time to reorganize her armies and develop fresh routes for oil to take part of the load which used to be carried on the imperilled Volga. When the full story is toid it will probably reveal that many of the defenders were the workers of the factories; men who fought not because they were trained soldiers-they were trained in their spare time-but be- cause, while they lived, they were not going to see the Germans take their fac- tories or come plundering farther into their Soviet Russia. Even the Germans admit it among their lies. " We have been held up," said a military spokesman the other day, " not by fortifications, not by generalship, but by the resistance of the Russian people." Many attempts have been madc to ex- plain, or analyse, the Russian fighting spirit. No one phrase can cover it. To say that the Russians have always fought well is as insufficient as to say that they fight because they believe all property in the socialist State to be their own. Both statements have to be added together and amplified before the whole truth is any- 'vhere near. About the traditional fighting mettle of the Russian there can be little doubt. Memoirs from the Napoleonic invasions read poignantJy like reports of to-day. Thiere are Caulaincourt's notes on Boro- dino:- The Russians showed the utmost tenacity; when they had to give up their flcldworks and certain ground. they did so without disorder. Their ranks did not brcak; hammercd bv our artillery, hacked by our cavalry, pushed back by our bayonets, their somewhat slow-moving masses met death bravely, and only retreated slowly before the fury of our attacks. These successes, which gave him neither prisoners nor prizes, made the Emperor discontented. Often he would say to the Prince of Neuchatel and myself: These Ruissians let themselves be killed like automatotis. They are not taken alive. That's no help to us in any Wiay. These citadels will have to be demolished with cannon." Automatons ? But the Russian at home is usually abounding with life, emotional, sensitive to grief and suffering, quick in responding to happiness. The opposite of what niany say, his mind is vividly indi- vidualist: he will explain that he is made up a little differently from the usual run, really quite a character, often surprised at hiniself, and so forth. How, then, comes the great abnegation of self when it comes to fighting? In the last war, until the final break,-Russian soldiers would come marching up without arms, confident that they would equip themselves in the trenches by picking up the rifles of those who had been killed before them. ABIDING VIRTUES The inquirer is brought immediately into touch with the ancient and abiding virtues of bravery and love of country. Neither is exclusively Russian. The men of Trafalgar and Waterloo could salute the men of Borodino and Beresina. The High- landers at St. Valery in 1940, the men of the Rawalpindi, the British airmen of a thousand battles, the seamen of the con- voys, can send their greetings to the de- fenders of Sevastopol and Stalingrad. But each people has a quite special kind of affection for its own country. In the past the strength and size of Russia seems to have possessed the people as a mysterv; they were set in the midst of a boundless plain, a 'world to itself unchanged for generations, seemingly tolerant of hunian activities; and the mystery and stability of it all convinced them of the fleetingness of one human life. Russia would go on no matter what happened to theni. Perhaps more than ever, the Russian now grows up with a sense of the great- ness of his country. Where he has less of a mystery he lhas a far greater sense of personal achievemcnt in tlec progress; and with this sense there goes the Slav's vivid affcction for the particular part of the country in which lie is born. Fewer than ever of the Russians are disposed to shirk the answer to Gogol's question: "What do you w'ant of me, Russia? What is there between you and me ? " MATERIAL PROGRESS Courage, love of countrv great power of physical endurance, even the advan- tages of geography, are fruitless by them- selves without the hard material means of equipment. Other nations of Europe during the past three years have had the first tlhree in abundance and have been overthrown in less than a month. Nor would the extra advantage of geography alone have saved Russia. The men of the Red Army undoubtedly fight with added spirit because they know of the great material progress which their countrv has made during the past 15 years. They have an extra sense of hatred against the in- v?Aer who destroys the great works which their own hands built. But this progress has also given them the arms without which all their valour and love of country would be in vain. A quarter of their country, formerly the-richest quarter, has gone. But wise strategic planning of industry in Siberia and in the Urals during the Five-Year Plans-planning turned to reality by labour on a scale without precedent and without thought of immediate human comforts-has brought them a flow of arms from new factories and new mines where previously were only steppe and forest. Had the Germans reached the \'olga 10 v'ears ago, or cven five, Russia wvould now; be finished in truth. As it is, Hitler's " marshes," the parts of Russia which he says contemptuously he will not invade, contain the arsenals from which the Red Armies can fight on with diminished but unbroken strength. In the last war the lack of railways for sup- plies was perhaps the greatest single handi- cap from which Russia suffered. During the past 15 vears that lack has to a large extent been made good. This time the Russian soldier has gone to the front equipped. Through this general fabric therc is laced a strong disciplinary network, both military and civilian. 'rhe Soviet people are fighting for freedom in a total war; and total war demands the subordination of all and everything to the State. To be- lieve that the tens of thousands of trans- ferred workers all weent to Siberia volun- tarily is to misconceive the determination which drives the Russian leaders and people. Complaints about the " incon- veniences of war " would find shoit shrift in Russia at the hour of its peril. This summier, when the German armies advanced rapidly from Millerovo and on across tle .Don, the Soviet newspapers suggested that the sternest mcasures were applied. Commanders who retreated before orders wvere given were publicly named. For exarnple, in Pravda:- Lictitcnant Dmitry Stcpanov started to rmn. The commander's cowardice cost us dearly. Stepanov had forgotten his milit&iry duty. Attempting to save his life, he subjected the lives of his men and the honour of his country to mortail blows. He did not save his life. lie died a pitiable, shamefuil death. Whole regiments were similarlW singled out for public shame:- This is an example and a reproach to those who find themselves encircled, or imagine them- selves to be. and passively lay down their arms, awaiting help from outside, forgetting their own resources an(d losing the will to struggle. TWENTY YEARS AGO The tension on the southern front during that sharp German brcak-through resembled the crisis in the civil war, more than 20 years ago, when Stalin (still called Djugashvili by many at that timc) descended on besieged Tsaritsin (soon to be called Stalingrad) and gave the order, ' Get rid of the faltercrs and nitwits." Soviet Russia does not allow its policy to be shaped by whai falterers, nor even by what " the ordinary man," ma' be think- ing; its war policy is based on the standard of what the superlatively brave can do. That is both the high example and the stern measurement. Lastly, the spirit of Russia at war is given enormous force-and impetus by the tide of hatred for the invader. It first arose among the people whcn they saw with their eyes the Germana firing squads and hanging parties; when they saw, or heard, that civilians were bcing butchered; when they rcalized that their whole countrv was menaced by the devilish apparatus of modern German power. Since then Stalin and the other Soviet leaders have proclaimed the neces- sity of hatred. "It is impossible," Stalin has declared, " to vanquish the enemy un- less you Icarn to hate him with all the strength of your heart and soul." Writers and broadcasters quote Gcrman military pundits of 40 or 50 years ago to prove how well the present German armies have learned their lessons. " In 1914 they started to rehearse. They destroyed mil- lions, but that was not enouglh for them. Then they found a worthy leader, Hitler." In such a mood, bitter and rcsolute, the Russian people grcet the defenders of Stalingrad. THE SYMBOL OF STALINGRAD OLD LOVE OF COUNTRY AND NEW ACHIEVEMENT STERN MEASURES AGAINST BACKSLIDERS