House Of Lords. Law Report, May 14. (Before ihle r.mD CaAnC=L0o, LORD BUCo:ASTMS, LonR. DuzcIDLN, LORD P."xLmK of VADDbrGOTos, and LoRD Suaem-n.) Their Lotdships to-day delivered their considered ludgment dismissing by a majority this appeal from a decision of tho Court of Appeal (31 The Times Lawv Itcports, 018) affirming a judgment of Mr. Justice Joyce (31 The Tipmes Law Reports, 389). The appel- lants' case was that the respondent company, which -Was a Company limited by guarantee and incorporated tunder the Companies Acts, was constituted princi- pally to Esubvert the Christian religion and all other religions, and was an iUegal corporation; and that a bequcst in trust for the company was invalid. Mr. Justice Joyce and the Court of Appeal (the Master of the - Rolls and Lords Justices Pickford and Varrington) upheld-the validity of the bequest. The facts are fully stated in the judgment of tho .Lord ChanceUor. The appeal was argued in January and February. last. Mr. G.'J. Talbot, K.C., and Mr. J. A. Price appeared for the appellants, and Mlr. Tomlin, K.C., and the REon. Malcolm Macnaghten for the respondents. 'JUD6tiE*ZT OF TE: LoRD CHANCELLOR. *The. LoRD CuAxCELLo. said that the question in this case was as to the validity of a bequest of residuo to the respondents, the Secular Society (Limited). The right of the respondents to payment was attacked by the present appellants, the next-of-kin of the testator, on the ground that the objects of the re- spondents' society were such that the bequest was not enforceable. The decision of the case must turn on the proper construction of the memorandum of association of the respondents' society, and the viewv to be taken of the law of England with regard to bequests for such purposes as are there enumerated. The memorandum of association so far as. material wvas as foUovvs:- (3) The objects for which the company Is formed are:- n) Tfo promote. in such ways as nmay from tlAme to time be deter- inened, the principle that human conduct should be based mpon satural 3nowledge. and not upon supernatural belief: and that uumuinn.rlfaLrc in this world is the proper end of li thouight and actien (6) To promote the utmost freedom of inquiry and the publica- tion Of Its discoveries. ?l t To prominote the secularization of the State. so that religious tests and obsenrances masy be banished from the Leglalature. tho Rzecutvee. and the'Judiciary. (d) fro Promote the abolition of all support. patrouge., or favour by tie State of any particular fort or forms of rehlou. (ego irPoote univela secular education. wit?outany religious teacian in public schools maintained lia auz way by mlunicpa rates or irpeiat taxatlon in) To Promote an alteration In the laws ooncernmn relliion. 60 that all ferms of oDinion may have the same legal rights of rropa- gand aad endowment. 1g1 lo promote the recOgnition b,' the State of marriage as a purely civil contrmct. leavinf Ireiutsgoeus sanctions to the Judgment and deter-inatlon of individual eluzens. tt) To p mmote the recognition of Sunday by the State as a purely Civil Instituton for the beneUt of the people and the repeal of %l abbatlarian laws devised and oecatlinr in the interest of reiigious acet. reWlious observances, or reigcious idea. In his opinion the governing object of the society was that which was stated in. paragraph 3 (a) of theo memorandum of association, and the other objects stated in the memorandum under heads (6) to (o) of the third paragraph vere subsidiary. He agreed with what was said by the founder of the respondent society in an article from the Freethinier, June 19, 1898, which was in evidence, " ClausO a is of the highest importance and governs everything else." It Was argued on behalf of the respondents that some, at all events, of the objects of the society vere not affected by any taint of illegality-e.g., that 3 (d) and (c), which stated Disestablishment and universal secular education as objects to be pro. maoted, were in themselves . harmless. It was, of ,course, the fact that either of these two objects mnight be advocated from motives which were entirely friendly to religion. But if (a) was the goverain7g object, then these and all the other clauses in the memorandum must be read by its light; in other words, all the other clauses in the third paragraph vere so many ways of carrying into practical appllca- tion the principle enunciated in the first paragraph of clause 3. That clause, in his opinion laid down quite clearly that huma;n conduct should' not be based on supernatural belief. That amounted to a negation of all religion, including, of course, the christian religion, as goverting human conduct, if the influence of supernatural motives was to bo eliminated, tho Christian religion was discarded in common with anl formis of religion in the ordin5iry sense of the term. He thought, therefore, that the memoranduju showved that the object of the society was to promote in various ways the principle that human knowledge should be based on natural knowledge onlv, and that human welfare in tlhs world was 'the proper end of allh tought and action. Was a legacy in fcvour of a.society.which existed for such 'a purpo.ie en,foice- able by English law ?' 'J'vo preliminary p6ints; weve taken con behaLf of the respond1rnts. ('hey coiitbnded -first, that the certilieato of incorpnration was conl- clusive to shoiv that the objects or the society were not unlawful ; and, secondly, that sonfo of the objects Wecre not unlawful, and that it could not, be pre- sunicd that tlhe legacy in question iNould be applied to any but laivful objects. Upon the first point his Lordship referred to Sectiols 18 and 192 of the Companies Act., 1862 sectioni I of the Companies Act, 1900, and section 17 of the Comupanies Consoldation Act, i90s, and stated his opinion that the argumena of the respondenc0 was ani attenmpt to extend the effebt of these enactmencs beyond bheir fair meaning and nmanifest object, and that this point failed. He was aLso of opinion thit the second point failed because the subsidiary objects, though they might be harmless in themselves, were Icre applications of the governing principles stated in 3 (a). Their Lordships were therefore driven back on thc question whether that object was legal. thrt I ralbot, on behalf'of the appellants, contended that It wa Lillegal on two grounds-first, that it was crininal to attack the Christian religion, however decent and temperate might be the form of atttack; secondly, that a Court of law would not assist in the promotion of such objects as that for which this society was formed, whether they were criminal or not. * After an exhaustive review of the authoritie4 on both points, tho Lord- Chancellor was of opinion-, first, that the crime of blasphemy was not constituted by a temperate attack on religion in which the decencies of controversy weie maintained; but, sedondly, that Christianity w.as part of the law of the land, and that the civil polity of the nation was to a large extent based upon the Christian relgion; that tho Courts would not help in the promotion of objects contrary to the Christian religion apar. 'ltogether from any criminal liability; and that, if the lawr of icngland was to he altered on the point the ch,ange must be effected not by judicial decision, but by the set of the Legislature. The legacy wnas given and would be taken for the purposes of the society, as stated in the memorandum, and if those purpos-es were illegal their illegality was not mended by the certificate of incorporation. In his Lord- ship'S opinion.they were illegal int the sense that the law would net aid in their promotion, and the appeal ought to be allowed. 'Loan DoHEnri said that he had had tho advantage of sceing not only the judgment just delivered by the Lord Chancellor, but' also those about to be delivered by Lord Parker and Lord Bucklmaster. It was said for the appellant that the Court would not lend its assistance for tho furtherance of an illegal object, and that money given t6 the society must needs be ilegally applied because it certainly could only be used for objects in terms of the memo- ratdum, and such objects wer illegal be6a4se ther Christian religin was part of the law of tho land. Now it money was laid out on.pubicationis or lectures in terms of the objects of the memorandum, such Publications oil lectures need not be couched in sonorious language, and so teed not be such as would constitute the crime* of blasphemy at common law. Nor need they be criminal inder the Blasphenly Act ; for the Act was so framed as to inals its penalties aPPlynly when there had been what might be termed Criminal fiability beinLg negatived, no one had suggested, any statute in terms of which it-byo whicl ho meaut the siipposed use of thho money- 'was dirtaectly prohibited. oelthher had it beng hold, he thought, as beingr a&ainst public Policy', zas that pIfras h was apleyed in the cases that had been decided on that head. Now if t-his, was so, he confessed he Could not bring himself to believe that there was still a tera mnedia of -thina illegal, which Aftere n cussi not diach thr prh hibte 'd not resthi coni a oui s, said nho did notst thptb ph ompcy ny that heLX tthougt cas s ortnhe rmiensulte of. holdn Optha anyhn ioncatonsistean,atwiontheCrieint vas par raof vytheoa sofit shladould not,inpany thy e assisted was seek ing.the assistance of the Courts the carry out the objects of the memorandum. It was seeking their asistance only to compel the s executor to do his duft, so that it might receive what was oeIally due to ~ t.f the legacy were duoi to. an Indiv=iduall, tshe executor would not be heard to discuss the probable uses to which the legatee would put the money. He (his Lordship) did not think he could do o in the ea-s of the soci6ty. For after nil-and treating the memoranduim, in stait. of thae opinion he had expressed ahready, as ndicating purposes entirely illegal such as in contract would not servo as*.foundation for an actlon-t1crf was no reason whyc uthe societry shulcotmpemplod y ath onety, in paying at vrincipe rent. Foru.lduob raons, Iand thos&e' stoatied one u by hiIobeanoered frieTnds toere bto followhim, heawasdofhopinionthatb tohe tppeal should bae dsmis subed. s wihre iedth. Lordt ofunedin,i LoanD PAiu m,in concurring with Lord Dunedin, after discussing the authorities, said that they were sufficient to estabish that the rairt object of the, society's memorandum was not open to objection as contrary to-the policy of the lavv. It was not illegal, for it did not involve blasphemy. It was not irreligious, for it was at any rate consistent with that negative deism which was held edt to be irreigious in Pare v. Clegg (291 eav, 9). Itwasnotimmworalorseditiousn It was, no dwubto anti-Christian. but, to adopt the words of Mr. Justice Coleridge in Shore v. Wilson (OC. and P., at p. 539)- There Is nothlniz unlawful at comimon lawv in reverently deubting or doni doctrines -parcel of Christainn ty however fundamental. it wofl be ditfcult to draw a line In Bau natte.stacecrcun to erfedt ovtliodoxy or to dein,e ow far one n4l t depart fiom t In believingf er teshina witheut'offendlii, the lw. The Only safe and. a I seeing to me. practigual role Is that which I havep eut and which desendg on the sobrlety ani reverence sad ser with which the teahlnger beieving, howevererroneoeas. ae 'ain- tained. He was glad to beable to come to that conclusion. ,It would be a serious matter for their Lordships' House, uniless clearly compelled by authority, to lay down a principle which would, not bu ly lead to the! anomalies pointed out by elord Buckmaster, but would preclude the Courts of this countr' fr m gvn eff6et to trusts for the purposes of-religions' which, however sacred they nomight be 'to milions of hiS fajesty's subjects, either deied t,he truth of Christi- anity or, at any rate, did not accept some of its funda- mental doctrines.- Ho thought that the appeal failed. * CERisT&NrrTr woT PAnTe os ouit LAw. 'LORD SumNcsn (in.agreeing with Lord Dunedin and Lord Parker) saidl tht the question was. wbether'yn anti-Christian society was inciSpable of claiming a legacy duly bequeathed to it merely because it was anti-Christian. With al respect for the great names of the lawyers who had used it, the phrase "bChristi. anit-y is part of the law of Engladd - was really not law; it was rhetoric; as truly mo as was -Erkine's peroration when prosceuting Williams. " No man can be expected' to ho faithful to the authority of man. who revolts against t we government of Gr d." One asked what pact of their law ninght Christianity be. and what part of Christianity might it be that was Part ofw their law? Chief Justice Best once said in Bird v. Holbrook (4 Bing, at p. e41, a case ofoininry bysetting aspring-gun) :--" There is no act which Cristinity forbids that thhe law wili not reachi; i it were otherwise Christianity would not be, as it has always been, held to be part of the law of England "; but tan t was rhetoric too. - Spring-guns, indeed, were got rid of, not by Christianity, but by Act of Parlian nsent, "Thou shalt not steal"ire was part ofi their law. a Thou shalt not commit adultery was part of uthir law, but another part, " Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself," was not part of their law at ail. Christianity had tolerated chattel slavery; noth so the Present law" of England. Theirs was, and always had been, a Chtristian State. The English faglyn was buit onmChristian ideaefe an if the national rot wrs t Chra were washl nose. PlId thaw aighmet wellre cellied ao Chistia lau, butet itheyu raplielay sof itha Ulesarand, mostbofists, principls,s andithequa jsticiaehiu and equallgoo goviernen, inl heathetn commanitries, and itsanc tions, eend inhat Hlto wasnof opiymniont acts doneriarars andph (a)ho sohland othr,naraiapsi o gt.he orespondens' membo-l tne appd ea shoum.pellsmsed . tory?rayrc'ok tat thei common la:w of England did not render crimwnal the mere prope n of doctrines hostie to the Christian faith. crime consisted in the maonner in which the doctrines were advocated; It was tshen said tiat,'even if this weet conceded,- the object% of the society were iliegal, not,in the sense that acts done to further itns objects would he criminal, but that they were of such a nature as to bo incapable of establishing a legal right to receive money for their furtherance. He found it difficult to appreciate this. disincion bu heundrstod hecontention to be that Christiasit was opanittof theioso lawea sofdb that argume.-M were carried to itsf ent ithwoul really show that Unitarians, Positivss otss and. -other similar religious. and ethiclbde,nes relieved by statute, were illegal assoitin,fo h Christianity knowvn to the commonla was certainly not Unitarian Christianity, norwsi reconcilable with the doctrines 'of 'Comte o.Hgl Again it would result that editors and pbihr would he able to deny pay'ment to contrbtr n authors whom they had expressly emploe owiepio sophical andl selentihle artieles orbosIficul be decided that the work was, anti-Chita,wieno one -could be.compelled to Pafor, n sc books when purchastd. liadeed, thie dcrn,a see to hisp Lordship, would applyt a el of. classical and scientific litertr,adte condi- tions which would condemn 'ths ok ih vary. from year to year as different viesfo timetoim prevailedi.c After dicssing the aut-horities his Lordship said that ho wvas of opinion that t-his appeal should be dismissed'. Solicitors.-Messrs. Calder, Woods, and Pethick; Mlessaw Stoneham and Sons. HOUSE OF LORDS. THE LAW OF ENGLAND AND CHRISTIANITY. BOWMAN AND OTHERS v. THE SECULAR SOCIETY (LIMI TED).