Queen's Bench Division. (Before the Loun CnIlE' JUSTICE.) His Lordship sat to-day for the trial of actions under Order XIV. At the conclusion of one of the cases his LORDSuiP said that it was ene in which a sumimons under Order XIIV. ought never to have been taken out at all, as there was a substantial defence to the action. Mr. MoRTEs, who was counsel for the plaintiffs, said that a summons under Order XIV. was the only means of getting a case placed upon the short cause list, and he suggested that the better wvay would be that cases should be set down for trial in the short cause list upon a certificate of counsel that they were suitable, as was done in the Cbancery Division. The LORI, C}I[F5 JuSTIC.-Mr. Mlorten, if you will consult with your friends and formulate a proposal in accordance witk your suggestion I shall be glad to bring the matter before the Role Committee. It would be material to inquire whether the certificate of both counsel should be required. hIr. MonT-vv.-Yes, the defendants might object for the purpose of delay. (Before MR. JUSTICE WRIGHIT.) WILKc?INSON V. DOWNTON. This action, wvhich raised an important and novel point of law, was tried before Mr. Justice Wright and a common jury, and was reported in The Times of Monday last. The case came before hisLordshipto-day for further consideration of the legal question whether the action was maintainable, and, if so, what damages were recoverable. The action was brought by Mr. T. A. Wilkinson and his wife, 31rs. Lavinia E. Wilkinson, of 25, St. Paul's-road, Burdett-road, B., against Mr. T. Downton, of 189, Bnrdett-road, for damages for false and fraudulent and malicious repre- sentation. The plaintiff, Mir. T. A. Wilkinson, is a licensed victualler, and the statement of claim alleged that " On the 9th of April, 1896, the plaintiff, Thomas Andrew Wilkinson, went by train to see the Harlow Races, xnd in the evening of the same day,theplaintiff, Thomas Andrew Wilkinson, being absent, the de- fendant entered the poblichouse at 25, St. Paul's-road, and then and there falsely, fraudulently, and maliciously told the plaintiff, Lavinia Elizabeth Wilkinson, that he had received a message from her said husband that the said Thomas Andrew Wilkinson had had a ' smash np,' and was at that time lying at tho Elms publichonse, Leytonstone, end that the said Thomas Andrew Wilkinson had desired the said defendant to request the plaintiff, Lavinia Elizabeth Wilkinson, to go down at once with a cab and fetch some pillows to take her hxsband home. The said defendant further falsely traudulently, and maliciously said to the plaiati4f Lavinia Elizabeth Wilkinson, that her said husband had returned from the races wvith sume friends in a wagonetto, and was seriously injured, all of which statements the said defendant well knowing to be false and frandulent, and spoken by him, the said defendant, with iatent maliciously to and well Imowing that he would thereby aggrieve, injure, and annoy the sgid plaintiff, Lavinia Ilizabeth Wilkinson. By reason of the said false, fraudulent and malicious statements of the said defendant, the piaintiff Lavinia Elizabeth Wilkin- son, suffered great mental anguish, and was nade seriously ill, and her hair -was turned white, and her life was for some time in great danger, and the plaintiff, Thomas Andrew Wilkinson, by reason of the grievances herein complained of, has suffered distress of mind on account of his said wife's condition, and has incurred considerable expense for medical attendsnce on his said wife and otherwise in respect of her said illness, and has lost the service of his said wife and has been other- wise damaged." In the particulars of damage the plaintiffs said that Mrs. Wilkinson's illness was nervous prostration, followsed by weakness, lsS of appetite, and sleeplessness. They claimed 3s. lOd. for the cost of railway fare to and from Leytonstone. They also claimed ?18 for loss of the female plaintiff's services and ?6 for extra nourishment, and ?E500 damages. As to the railway fare of 3s. lOd. the particulars stated that " the defendant, by his false and malicious repre- sentation as mentioned in the said statement of claim, induced the plaintiff, 1avinia Elizabeth Wilkinson, to part with or otherwise expend a certain sum of money in journeying to and from Leytonstone, the said de- fendant weU knowing that his said false and malicious representation wiould and did cost the amount set out in these particulars." Mr. Justice Wright left the fol- lowing questions to the jury :-(1) Did the defendant speak the wsords alleged or to the effect ? (2) Did he mean themn to be heard and acted upon or say them in such a way as if so meant ? (3) Were they believed and acted upon ? (4) Were they false to his know- ledge ? (5) WVhat were the damages with regard to the expense of the journey?P (6) Wlras the illness the effect of the shock from tho words ? (7) What were the damages caused by the illness of the female plaintiff ? The jury answered questions 1, 2, 3, 4, and6 in the affirmative. Thoy assessed the damages under question 5 at is. 1O.^d. and under question 7 st ? u100. MIr. Warburton end Mr. A. N. Talbot appeared for the plaintiff; Mr. Abinger for the defendant. MIt. JUSTICE WVnIGHT, after stating what was the *ause of action as set out in the statement of claim, said that the defendant, in execution of what he seemed so have regarded as a practical joke, represented to the Dlaintiff tlat he was charged by her husband with a noessage to her, to the effect that the husband had been 3mashed up in an accident, and was lying at the Elms publichouse at Leytonstone with both legs broken, and that she w'.s to go at once in a cab with two pillows to bring him home. All this was false. The effect of the statement onthe plaintif was aviolentshocktohernervous system, producing vomiting aud other more serious and permanent physical conscquences,at one time threatening her reason, and entailing weeks of suffering and in- capacity to her, as well as ex:pense to her husband for medical treatment of her. These consequences were not in any way the result of previous ill-health or weakness of constitution ; nor was there any evidence of predis- position to nervous shock or of any other idiosyncrasy. in addition to these matters of substance there was a small claim for ls. lOd., the cost of the railway fares of persons sent by the plaintiff to Leytonstone in obedi- ence to the pretended message. As to this Is. 10id. expended in railway fares on the faith of the defend- ant's statement, the case was clearly within " Pasley v. Freeman "(3 T.R., 51). It was a misrepreseatation which was intended to bo acted on to the damage of the plaiatiff and which was in fact acted on. The real question was as to the ?0100, the greatest part of which was given as compensatien for tho female plaintiff's illness and suffering. It was argued for her that she was entitled to recover this as being damage caused by fraud and therefore within tho doctrine established by " .tasley v. Freeman " and " Lacgridge v. Levy " (2 M. and W., 529). His Lordship was not sure that this would not-be an extension of that doctrine, the real ground of which appeared to be that, a person, wh6 made a false statement intending it to be acted on,must make good the damage naturally resulting from its being acted on. Here there -was no injuria of that kind. He thought, howvever, that the verdict might be supported on another ground. The defendant bad, as his Lordship assumed for the moment, wilfully done an act calculated to cause physical pain to the plaintiff- i.e., to infringe her legal right to personal safety, and had in fact thereby caused physical pain to her. Thrt lroposition, without more, appeared to his Lordship to state a good cause of antion, thers being no justification alleged for the act. This wilful iacurita was in law malicious, although no malicious purcose to cause the harm which was eaused, nor any motive of spite, was imputed to the defendant. It re- mained to consider whether the assumptions involved in the preposition were made out. One quebtion was whcther the defendant's act was so plainly calculated to produce some effect of the k-iDd which was pro- duced that an intention to produce it ought to be imputed to tho defendaDt. Regard being had to the fact that the effect was produced on a person p roved to be in an ordinary state of health and mind, his Lord- ship thought that it was. It was dliffiuult to imagine that such a statement, made suddenly and with apparent seriousness, could fail to produce grave effects, under the circumstances, upon any but an exceptionaUy in- different person, and therefore an intention to produce such an effect must be imputed, and it was no answer in law to say that more harm was done than was anticipated, for that was commonly the case with all wrocga The other question vas whether the effect was, to use the ordinary phrase, too remote to be in law regarded as a consequence for which the defendant was answerable. Apart from authority his Lordship would give the same answer, and, on the same ground, as to te lIst question, and say that it was not too remote. Whether,' as the majority of tho Lords thought in " Lynch v. Knight "(9 H. L. C. 577),the criterion was in asking what would be the natural effect on reasonable persons,, or whether, as Lord Wensleydale thought, the possiblo infirmities of human nature ought to be rccognized, it scemed to his Lordship that the connexion between the causo and effect was isuficiently close and complete. It was, however, necessary to consider two authorities which were supposed to havo laid down that illness through mental shock was a too remote or unnatural consequence of an 'injuria to entitle the plaintiff to recover in a case where damage wva5 a necessary part of the cause of actiou. One was the easo of " Victorian Railway Commis- sioners T. Coultas " (L. R., 13 Apn. Cas. 222), where it was held in the Privy Council that illness, which was the effect of shock caused by fright, was too remote a consequence of a negligent act which caused the fright, there being no physical harm immediately caused. That decision was treated in the Court of Appeal in " Pugh v. London, Brighton, and South Coast Railway Company " (189u, 2 Q.B., 248) as open to question. It was inconsistent with an earlier decision in the Court of Appeal in Ireland (see " Bell v. Great Northern Railway Company " (L.R., Ireland, 26 C. L. 42S), when the Irish Exchequer Division declined to follow " Victorian Railway Commissioners v. Coultas," and had been disa 7rove in the Supreme Court of New York (see Poiloek on Torts), nor was it altogether in ypoint, for there svas not in that ease any element of wilful wrong, nor perhaps was the illness so direct and natural a consequence of the defendant's ceadnct as ix this case. On theso grounds it seemed to the learned Judge that the case of the " Victorian Railway Commissioners v. Coultas " was not an autho- rity on whieh this case ought to be decided. A more serious diiEculty was the decision in " Alsop v. AlUsop" (1860, 5 E. and N., 534), which was approved in the House of Lords in " Lynch v. Knight." In that case it was held by Chief Baron Pollock and Barons Martin, Bramwell, and Wilde that illness caused by a slanderous imputation of unchastity in the case of a married woman did not constitute such special damage as would sustain an action for such a slander. That cano. howeever. apinated to havo bee. dpcideA.Qi the grounds that in all the innumerable-actions for slander which had occurred there were no precedents for alleging illness to be sufleient sppcial damage, and tbat it would be of evil conseouence to treat it as sufficient, becauso such a rule might lead to an infinity of trumpery or groundless actions. Neither of these arbeOD W15 applicable to the present Cese, uor could suc eadopted as of general application with- out results which it would he difficult or impossibln to defend. Suppose that a person was in a precarious and dangerous condition, and another person falsely told him that his physician had said that he had but a day to live. In such a caso, if death ensued from the shoel caused by the false statement, his Lordsbip could not doubt that the case might be one of criminal homicide, or that, if a serious aggravation of illness ensued, damages might be recorered. He thought, however, tbat it mast be admitted that the present case was without precedent. Some English decisioas, such as "1 Jones v. Boyce " (1 Stark. N.P., 493), " Wilkins v. Day " (L.R.,12 O.B.D., 110) " IHarris v. Nobbs" (L.R., 3 Ex. D., 260), were cited in Mr. Beven's bool on Negligeuce as inconsistent with the decision in " Victorian Railway Commissioners v. Coultas." But his Lordship thought that those cases were to be ex- plained on a different ground-namely, that the damage which immediately resulted from the act of the passenger or of the borse was really the result. not of that act, but of a fright, which rendered that act involuntary, and which therefore ought to be regarded as itself the direct and immediate cause of the damage. In " Smith v. Johnson and Co.," decided in January, 1897, Mr. Justice Bruce and his Lordship held that where a man was killed in the sight of the plaintiff by the defendant's negligence, and the plaintiff became ill, not from t'.he shock of fear of harm to himself, but from the shock of seeing another person killed, this harm was too remote a consequence of the negligence ; but that was very different from the present one. His Lordship gave judgment for rhe plain- tiff for ?100 Is. 10ld. (Sifing8 in Banlkruyfcq,, befcre MR. REGISTRAR LIsrLITM.) IN I1E WADn. Upon the application of Ir. M. S. RUBInNSTIN, solicitor, His HoNoLm made a receiving order under a petition presented against Edwin S. Wade, described as temporarily residing8 at Teddington, and at the Bad- minton Club, Ficcad!lly. The debtor states that he has not been engaged in any business, but has been connected with the sugar trade. - He has some property in the West Indies, in respect of which a receiver has been appointed by the Court of Chancery. The amount of the liabilities did not transpire. " Tin ER PON CITY. "-rn the report of the judg- ment of Mr. Justice Gorell Barnes in The Times of Friday, on page 4, in line 34 from the bottom of the third column, the word " suggested " should be read instead of " contested," and in the last line of that column the word " plaintiff " should be read instead of " bill. " Trz RULE COMMITTZZ OF TIM JuDGis.-The Lord Chancellor will preside over a meeting of the Rule Committee of the Judges which will be held at the House of Lords on Wednesday afternoon. It is under- stood their Lordships will have under their considera- tion the new rules wbich are to be substituted for the County Court rules issued in March last, which have just been anmulled by the Rale Committee. TIIZ COUNCIL or LZGAL EDUCAFIGO.-Mr. Reginald M. Bray, of the Inner Temple, bas been.- ceicted by the Benchers of that society a member of the ',ouncil of Legal Education in succession to Mr. Justice 'Charles, who recently resigned. QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION.