Supreme Court Of Judicature. LA W REPORT, July 5. (Before LORD ESEEr, LORD JUSTICE BOWEN, and LOI.D jUSTICE KAY.) BOALER V. BRITON MEDICAL AND GENERAL LIFE ASSOCI.LTION-BOAL EI, ON- REUALF OF, &C. V. BRITOi MEDICAL AND GEN-ErAL LIFE ASSOCIATION. This was an application on behalf of the company to dismiss these appeals on the ground that Boaler had agreed that they should be dismissed if the appeal in another of his actions against them should be dis- missed, which occurred the other day in the other Court of Appeal, the order appealed against being tO dismiss the action. Mr. DANCKWVErTS appeared for the company to dismiss the two appeals on the -roand of the alleged agreement, and read a letter from the plaintiff to prove it. [LORD JUSTIC YAY.-This isa casesimilar to that disposed of by us in the other Court of Appeal the other day, and in which it was stated that the plaintiff gave ;10 for his shares and had by his pro- ceeding put the company to an expense of ?30,000 ?] Yes; these appeals have reference to the same shares, or shares in the same company. The persistence in litigation by a party or person can put the other side to enormous expense, and so it has been in this case. It is desired to put a stop to it under the agreement. Mr. Boaler was heard against the application, insist- in that the expense was rather caused by the conduct of others, and denying the alleged agreement. The COURT granted the application, and dismissed the appeals. CARLILL V. TEE CARBOLIC SMOKE COMP,ANy. This was the case in which hlr. Justice Hawkins gave judgment yesterday for the plaintiff, as reported in Tc 2'imes of to-day. The action vas by a lady who had purchased aud used the carbolic smoke balls of the company, under the terms of an advertisement issued by them, to recover the sum of ?100, according to the terms of the advertisement, which was as follows :-" ?100 reward will be paid by the Carbolic Smoke Ball Company to any person who contracts the increasing epidemic influenza, colds, or any disease caused by taking cold, after having used the ball three timesdaily fortwo weeks,according-to the printed direc- tions supplied. ?1,000 is deposited with the Alliance Bank, legent-street, showing our sincerity in the matter - The plaintiff, in conseeience of this adver- tisement, purchased and used the aIls for two weeks three times a day, as directed, but, nevertheless, bad bad an attack of influenza, on which she claimed to recover the ?100 from the company. It was agreed that the case should be determined by the Judge, who on hearing her evidence, gave judgment for her, and refused to stay execution. Mr. CoH EN, QC., now moved, on the part of the company, for a stay of execution on bringing the money into Court, but he had no affidavit and laid no ground for his application. Mr. M1urphy, Q.C., appeared for the plaintiff, but was not called upon, and, Their LORDSErrrS reftused the application as no ground was laid for it. PRICE V. JA1ES. This was an appeal by the occupier of a beerhouse near Poatypool sgainst a decision of a Divisional Court on special case (on application for asLn ndasaus) affirming the refusal of the- justic-s to gritnt him a liceace. It was a case in w1hich, underthe Act of 1869, a refusal could only be on one or other of the four specific grounds assigned. One Miaso had been the holder of the licence, but in April, 1891, being convicted of an offence against the Ltcensing Act. his [licence was endorsed by the justices and he left. Price, the appellant, then became the occupier and on June 13 applied under 5 and 6 Vict.,c. 44, which allows of a temporary authority being given when there has been a transfer in the course of the year, andl obtained it ; and on August 21, the day of the special sessions for transfer of licences and also the day for the " brewster " sessions, he applied for transfer of 31ason's licence to himself up to October 10, and then for a renewal of the licence to hirnself for the next ensuing year. The superintendent of police opposed, having giLven notice to MIason, the holder of the current licence,but there was no notice to Price and no objection on any of the four grounds specified in the Act. The first application was refused as there had not been the proper notices. Then, as to the application for a renewal of a licence, it was opposed because he had no testimony as to character,while he contended that he was entitled to notice of objection on one of the four specified grounds under the Act of 1872, section 42. The application was refused, and,on appeal, the Divisional Court affirmed the refusal, ngainst which he appealed, and he also appealed on the ground that the superintendent of police ought not to have been the respondent. Mr. JsELF, Q.C. (with Mr. James Paterson), appeared on his part in support of his appeal, urging that he was entitled to the rene val. [LoRD Es}IEn. -Renewal of what ? The licence was to Mason. LoutD JUSTIcr K-vY.-The question is whether the mere temporary authority was equivalent to a licence to Price. LORD ESIIElR-He never was licensed.] The questions which arise are (1) whether he was actually licensed ; (2) whether tho proviso does not put him in the same position as if he had been licenised. [LORD ESHER.-The effect of the enact- ment yon rely upon is merely to give a temporary authority to carry on the business ; it is not equivalent to a licence.] The notice that there can- not be a renewal under the Act of a licence held by another person was overruled in " The Queen v. Justices of Liverpool " (11 Q.B.D.). It was an application for a transfer. [LORD JUSTICE KAY.- hopw can there be a II transfer' of a licence which has expired ?] That difficulty has been got over by the Courts since the case cited. [LORD EsytR.-There the application was under 9 Geo. IV., c. 61, s. 14, and for the grant of a licence.] But the argument turned on a right to renewal it was during the currency of the licence. [LORD JUSTICE BOWEN.-Then it is not mnaterial to the present question. LORD EssrEu.-The enactment in the Act of Geo. IV. has nothing to do with renewal ; it relates to the grant of a licence.] Thie result is the samc. [LORD JUSTICE KAY.-How can there be a transter " of a licence which has expired ? Tlbat was settled in recent cases, as " The Queen v. Powell," in Q.B. Reports for 1819, 6 92. [LORD ESsiiR.-We cannot help doubting it. Is this case within the enactment in the Act of Geo. IV. ?] No ; for it is an application for a renewal. [LoRD ESHER.-Then the case of " The Queen v. Liverpool " has nothing to do with the present for it was on section 14 of the Act of Geo. IV.] The applicant, as the occupier, was entitled to renewal Or Mason s licence without a " transfer." That was held in " The Queen v. Liverpool." In that case the applicant never had been licensed. [LORD JUSTICr BowVEu.-Yes; but the word " renewal " is not in the Act of 9 Gco. IV., and you apply a case under that Act to the construction of the Act of Victoria, in which there is the word.] The case stands on the same footing. Price being the occupier, was the only person who could apply for a licence and was entitled to ask for a renewal. [LORD JUSTICE KAY.-That would not be a " transfer."] It is so called. [LORD JUSTICE KAY.-Wrongly so ; the Alct distinguishes renewals from transfers.] That may be so but the phrase transfer is so used, and was so in " TAe Queen v. Powell." [LoRD JUSTICE KAY.-In that case the decision does not appear to have Deen as to a transfer, but as to a grant of a licence. LORD ESUER.-In The Queen v. Liverpool " the applicant was within 9 Geo. IV., c. 61, s. 4; here he is not.] The Act of Geo. IV. is virtually embodied in the 5 and 6 Vict. [LoRD ESsEn.-But how do you bring this case within it ?J Mlason had "removed," and Price was entitled to apply for a licence. [LORD ESiiER.-But he had not given the requisite notices.] He was the only possibie holder of a licence. [LORD ESHER.- But he could not get it ; how does the case cited help him ?l A person who has a temporary autherity under 9 Geo. IV., c. 61, is in the position of the holder of a licence, or an equivalent position, and is entitled, on his application for a licence, to notice of grounds of objection. [LORD ESHER.-The applicant bad no right to apply for a renewal of a licence; and the justices, quite apart from objection, had no juris- dliction to grant it.] That is contrary to " The ucen v. Liverpool," " The Queen v. Powell," and 'q The Queen v. Thomas " (Q.B. Reports, 1892). ILORD JUSTICE BOWEN.-Yon cannot succeed umless you bring yourself within section 42 of the Licensing Act, 1872, vhich refers to a person applying for a renewal of his licence; and here Price never had any .nd applied for a renewal or transfer of MIason's.] PRrice had virtually a licence under the temporary enactment. Then, lastly, the superintendent of police o,ught not to have been made the respondent to the appeal. [LORD JoSvrCE BOwVEN.-He was the opponent of the applicant before the justices, and how could it he otherwise F4 hIr. Poland, Q.C. (with MIr. Dm'niel), appeared for the respondent, hut LORD ESEIL said the Court did not desire to hear him on the main point as to the merits of the appeal. Mr. POLAN-D then briefly dealt with the last point, as to tho superintendent of police being respondent, and submitted that it could not beotherwise, under the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1879, under which the case was stated, incorporating the Summary Jurisdiction Act (20 and 21 Vict., c. 43), under which notice of appeal was to be given " to the other party " in the proceeding-that is, in this case, the superintendent who had opposed the applicant before the justices. [LORD E3}IER.-The superintendent of police is obviously interested in such applications.] Surely so, as responsible for the peace of the district. [LORD Es13-R.-Anybody interested in the good order of the district may appeal. LORD JUSTICE KAY.-As a resident,who objects to a publichouse near him being liceused.1 Their LORDSHIPS proceeded to give judgment for the respondent. LORD ESHER, in giving judgment, said M1ason, the former occupier and holder of the licence, had remoyed, and Price had succeeded him as occupier, and had, at the next licensing meeting, made two applications-one for the transfer or renewal of Miason's licence to him. That must have been made by him under 9 Geo. IV., c. 61, s. 14. The proper word, no doubt, would have been the " grant ' of a licence. That application, however, he bad a right to make and the magistrates could deal with it ; ut it failed because he did not produce any vouchers for character, and so it was refused. Upon that he made an application for a renewal of the licence under section 42 of the Act of 1872. But what licence could he claim to have renewed under that section ? Only " his " licence; so that he had to show that he wvas licensed, otherwise the magistrates had no juris- diction. But he had no licence, and so they had no jurisdiction. It was argued, indeed, that he badl what was equivalent to a licence in the temporary authority under the Act of 1842, 5 and 6 Vict. Now, id that Act grant any licence at all ? It was in truth no licence; it was not so described; it was an authority to keep open the house until the next special licensing session. It was not, in the proper sense of the term, a " licence." The application, therefore, was rightly refused, and the case was quite different from those cited. On the main point, therefore, the Divisional Conrt was right. Then, as to the other point-who was the proper respondent on such an appeal ?-any person interested who opposed the application niight be made the respondent. Here it was the super- intendent of police, who was generally the opponent, and consequently was the proper respondent on the appeal. The appeal, therefore,-mast be dismissed. LPORD JUSTICE BOWEN concurred. It was not, he said, disputed thati. the first application could properly be dismissed. The applicant then fell back on section 42 of the Act of 1872, but that only applied where a person was applying for a renewal of his own licence, and the appl,cant was not within the enact- ment. The applicant had only an interim authority to keep open the house ; not a licence. Indeed, it was not, properly speaking, an application for a " renewal " at all; certainly it was not an applica- tion which Price was entitled to make. On the other point also he concurred. There was no pretence for an appeal on either. LORlD JUSTICE 3K.&Y also concurred on both points. The applicant never had a licence, and was not entitled to notice. Appeal accordingly dismissed. (Before LOp.DS JUrSTICES LINDLEY, LOPES, and A. L. SIITH.) 3rILNER V. CLEATHERO AND NICIOLS (LIMITED). This was a motion for a new trial. The action wvas tried before Mr. Justice Wright onMay 17, and reported in The Times of MIay 19. The plaintiff sued as endorsee of a bill of exchange accepted by Mlessrs. Cleathero and Nichols personally. The action was founded (of course) not directly on the bill, to which the defendant company were not party ; but on a letter signed by 1r. Cleathero purporting to act as director of the defendant company, undertaking on behalf of the company to pay. The company was formed in 1890 for the purpose of taking over the business of Messrs. Cleathero and Nichols. The bill in question, which was in the nature of a renewal, was accepted in October, 1891. In November, 1891, a deed was executed between the company, as pnr- chasers, and Messrs. Cleathero and Nichols, as vendors, by which the purchasers of the business undertook to pay the trade debts, present and future, of the vendors, and Messrs. Cleathero and Nichols were appointed managiun directors and their special provinces defined. The bill sued on was dishonuured December 8, 1891. A correspondence ensued, in the course of which Mlr. Cleathero wrote the letter relied on by the plaintiff; it was written as on behalf of the company, and stated that theywere unable to pay at present, but would pay on January 11 if the plaintiff would wait; it was dated from the company's office on paper headed with the name and address of the com- pany and signed " Cleathero and Nichols-T. C. Cleathero." It appeared that at that time the company had very few. shares subscribed for; but in 1892 shares to the extent of some ?2,000 were taken up. The jury found that there was no real company and there was no authority in Cloathero to bind the com- pany. Judgment was given for the defendants. 31r. WITT, Q.C., and 31r F. NV.KKINGDON, in sup- port of the application, argued that the existence of the rompany was not a question for the jury, and that the finding that there was no authority was against the weight of evidence. No counsel appeared on behalf of the defendant company. LoBD JUSTIcB LinDLEY observed on tbe ieculiarity and suspicions nature of the deed of November, 1891. Hec saiTdtheir Lordships had been convinced by M,r. Witt that there was some consideration to support the alleged contract if it was authorized; the authority, if any, was to be found in the deed of November 1891 ; by that deed Mr. Cleathero was appointed general manager of the works, and the deed did not authorize him to enter into any such bargain as was set up by the plaintiff. In his opinion the jury had ample evidence to find there was no authority and had found a proper verdict. T.hc other LOrDS JUSTICES gave judgment to the same effect. SUJPRMIE COURT OF JUDICATUR. COURT OF APPEAL.