Queen's Bench Division. (Before LOrD COLERIDGE, Lord Chief Jstice, MR. JUSTICE MI'XISTY, MR. JUSTICE HAWI,S, R. JUSTICE CAVZ, MR. JUSTICE WILLS, and MR. JUSTICE GRANT1143.) THE QUZEN V. TOLSON. Judgment was delivered in this case, which raised an important question as to the offence of biqamy- whether, if the prisoner has remarried within the period of seven years, but, in the reasonable belief that the first husband (of the wife) was not living, the offence is committed. The ease was argued before all the Judges, who took time to consider their judg- ments, and were now divided in opinion. (There was a similar case which. was to follow the result of the first.) The prisoner had married on the l1th of Sep- tember, 1880. She was deserted by her husband ip December, 1881. Being led, after inquiries made by herself and her father, to believe that'he was lost in a vessel lost at sea, in January, 1887, she married again. Her first husband teturned in December, 1887, and the fury found that the prisoner in good faith and on reasonable grounds believed her first husband to be dead. The case mn substance was that the prisoner, a married woman, had married a, sec'ond -time, ir the belief, upon reasonable grounds which she believed to be true, that her first husband was dead. A few months after the second marriage her fist husband reanpeared. The 2f and 25th'Viet . c.10Oi_s.7, 57 ide5hat who_ ever, being married, shall marry any other person during thelife of the first wife or husband shall be liable, kc., provided that nothing shall extend to'any person marrying a second time, whose husband- (or rife) 'shall have been continally absent for seven years last past, and is not knowrn to be living at the tiae2JThe prisonerin the present case was writhin seven years after her husband had left her, but upon reason- able grounds,. believing him to be dead,. had re- married. MR. JUoS'ICE WILLS frst delivered judgment. The prisoner, he said, had rematried, believing, upon reasonable grounds whEich she believed to be true, that her f,rst husband -rris dead, but during the.life of her husband, he not having been continually absent for seven years. It was, he said, a principle of law that, ordinarily speaking, a crime is not committed if the-mind is innocent. Tho intention must concur with the Act, and a guilty mind implied the intention to do something wrong. There were, he said, con- ficting decisions upen the question,which he noticed; but in some cases it had been held that a reisonable -belief of the, death of the first husband-would be a defence. Having elaborately considered the cases on the subject, noticing particularly the case -of " The Qceen v. Prince " (2 '- Law Reports," Crown Cases), tne learned Judge 'arrived at the conclusion that the conviction could not be supported, aud he stated that 3fr. Justice Charles conenrred in t.ln'a injno MR. JUSTICE CAvE delivered jnudment wi the same result. At common law, he sid, an honest and reasonable belief of circumstances which, if true, would make the act innocent bad been held a de- fence. And an honest and reasonable mistake was a ground of defence applicable. to all criminal offences. An act done under an honest belief of its innocence was not criminal. To raise the defence, indeed, witbin the seven years it must appear that the pri- soner- honestly and on reasonable grounds believed that her first busband was dead ; wiereas, after the continued, absence of the husband for seven years, that of itself was a defence -without such belief. For these reasons he came to the conclusion that the convictioncould not be supported,and in this opinion, he said, Mr. Justice Day and Mr. Justice A. L. Smith concurred. MIt. JUsTIcE GRANTAMr then read the judgment of Mr. Justice Stephen, who had reserved the cases, and in which he concurred, to the effect that the convic- tion could not be supported. The prisoner, he said, in each of these cases had in good faith and in the belief, on reasonable grounds, of her husband's death, remarried; and he came to the conclusion that this was not a criminal offence. The learned Judge entered into elaborate legal reasonipg on the autho- ^ities to support this conclusion. The conduct of the woman, he said, was not immoral; it was morally innocent, and, even if an offence, to inflict more than a nominal punishment would be a scandal. To have contracted an invalid marriage was, in his opiion, punishment enough, and he considered that there was no criminal offence. MR. JuSTICE HAwsiNs then delivered judgment with the same result-that the wom,an ought not to have been convicted. There was, he said, that honest belief in the death of the first husband which drcluded the " guilty mind," which was of the essence of a criminal offence. The " guilty mind " which he deemed essential to the criminal offence meant an intention to do what was known to be wrong. There must be proof of the " guilty mind " to constitute a criminal offence, and it was absent in the present case. He could not believe that a woman who re- married in the honest and reasonable belief that her first husband was dead could be rightly convicted of the offence of bigamy. For these reasons he was of Opinion that the conviction should be quashed. MB. JUJSTICE h&NISTY was of opinion that it should be affirmed. The enactment, he said, prohibited the act of a second marriage, and rendered it criminal except after the lapse of seven years. It was for the Legislature, he said, to alter the law in that respect, if it was to be altered. Ignorance of the law was no excuse, if it turned out that the offence had been com- mitted. Circumstances might affect the sentence and make it merely nominal, but that was a different thing from holding that there was no offence. No doubt a public prosecutor would not institute a prosecution in such a case, and tn any prosecution under such circumstances a nominal sentence, as in the present case, would be inflicted. But it would be dangerous to allow it to be a defence that the wife was informed and believed that her husband was dead. He thought, therefore, that the conviction was right, and this, he said, was the opinion of Mr. Justice Denman, Mr. Baron Pollock, Mlr. Justice Field, and Mr. Baron Huddleston, and he read a brief judgment of Mr. Justico Denman and Mr. Justice Fiela to that effect. LoaD COLERIDGE then delivered judgment to the same effect as that of the majority, against the con- viction in each case. He had. he said, at first been of opinion that the conviction was right; but he had had the advantage of reading the judgment of Mr. Justice Cave, and he found it impossible to answer it, and he therefore thought, with some reluctance, that the opinion of the majority of the Judges must pra- vail. In saying this he did not desire to dissent from the case of "1 The Queen v. Prince," but in the present cases he concurred with the majority in hold- irg the convictions wrong. Conviction reversed. The SOsCIIToR-GENznAL said he (with Mr. R. S. Wright) had been retained to argue the case for the Crown, but had received an intimation that it was not desired that he should do so. (Before LoaD COLERIDGE, MR. JU1STICE MATEEnW, MR. JUSTnCE WILLS, Ma. JUSTICE CAVE, and MR. JuSTICE GAxnTHAh.) THE QUEEN V. GORDos. This was an indictment for obtaining money by false pretences, tried before Lord Coleridge at the Spring Assizes for Worcester under these circum- stances. The defendant was a moneylender at Worces- ter, and the prosecutor is a farmer at Worcester, who saw the defendant's advertisement and had re- course to him. Brown's wife had seen an adver- tisement of the prisoner's in a Worcester paper. They went to Worcester and saw the prisoner, and desired to borrow ?100. Her husband then went with his father to see the prisoner, but only got ?60 from him; but he could not read, and he and his son signed a document promising to pay ?100 in quarterly instal- ments by the endof two years. Brown received only?60 from the prisoner, and remonstrated, but prisoner said the ?40 was what he charged, and he and his father went home, when the wife saw only ?60 had been received, and they offered to return it, and this prosecution was instituted, in whichthe prisoner was charged, first, with obtainingthe note by false pretences, thefalsepretence being that be was prepared to lend the Browns ?100, and also on another count with obtaining the note for ?100 by false pretences, and on another countwithin- ducing them to make the note by means- of false pre- tences, and on two other counts, and on four of these the jury found him guilty. The case was reserved by Lord Coleridge for the Court of Criminal Appeal. Mr. LoCEwooD, Q.C. (with Mr. Young and Mr. Harington) argued for the prisoner that the charge could not be sustained on any of the counts. There was no false representation of an existing fact. [LoaD COLEnaIDGn.-Did not the prisoner lead the man to suppose he was to have ?100 ?] There was no criminal talse pretence. No doubt the prisoner did not mean to advance the ?100 ; but that was not a false pretence. [LoaD COLERBIGE.-It was for the jury to say whether he so pretended.] The learned counsel continued his argunent at some length. Mir- AIHLETT, for the prosecution, was not called upon to argue, but admitted that the last count could not be maintained. The COURT came to the ,conclusion that on one of the counts, the fourth-namely, "inducing them to make the said promissory n6to for ?100 by false pre- tence that he was prepared to pay them or one of them ?100 "-the conviction could be maintained. LoaD COLER;IDGE, in giving judgment, said that the true view of it was that the yrisoner would give the prosecutor the ?100 when he signed the note ; and he never intended to do so. That was a false representa- tion of an existing fact-that is, that the money was ready for delivery on the making of the note. It was contended that the note was not It valuable " until the maker had delivered it over to the defendant. The words of the Act 24 and 25 Vict., cap. 96, were followed in this count. The words of the Act were fulfilled, and the conviction must be sustained:on the fourth count. The other JUDGns concurred, and the conviction was accordingly upheld on the fourth count. O(TTRFlN'S nPNCR TDIVTSTON COUIRT FOR CONSIDERATION OF CROWN