Supreme Court Of Judicature. Y;AV'kPoBT. (Sittngs at Lrfor'-in be forc Lords JUSNOe JAaxxS, BAGGALLAY, and EBETT.) hBOUCIOAUrr V. CEHATTBTOS. The arume`ts ia tbh case were rosumod. A.e stated in The Times of yesterday, the plaintiff, Blr. Dion Bouicalt, appeal frota a decision of Vice-Chancellor Mlalins refusing to restrain by injunction the performnance at the A-delphi Theatre, of whioh the defendant Chatter. ton ia lessee of the plaintiff' drama called The Saluuglis'.auss i Infringement of the piayintiff's COP right therern The Sauwghrauns w witn in 1874 by the plaintiff, who is now acting in America, and wes first produced at Wallackes Theatre, New York, in October or November of that year. The play was registered at Itationers' Haill on the 29th of Bepmber d 1874, as a book under the Copyright Act, 6 and 6 vi7., capb 45e; but there being an inaecuracy in the form ot the registration the pLay was again registered on the 4t . of N vember, 1876, in the name of Mr. Dion Boucicaulti as the pdoprietor of the co right. In Apri 1875, after some negrotiation between a ph- plaintff and the defendant, who is the leseoo of Drury-lane, the Adelphi, and the Princess's Theeatres, the plaintiff, or Bocicauht wrote that he woetld open with the defendant on the Ilth of September next at Drur1-lane Theatre and play untl the 18th of December. Mr. Boucicault accordingly caae to England, and played in the Shaughsheun at Drury- lasn tiul the 18th of December last, The pertormance of the prsay on tho 11th of September, 1876, we, the first represen- tation of it in the United Kingdom. Soon after that Mr. Bouchiault inforehod the defendant that Amne- rics would bshortly be hi only home, as he had become a naturalized citizen of that country. After the 18th of December, 1875, the performiances were re- moved to atnd continued, by adrangement, aLt the Adelphi tilt about the 22d of Jarep ry last, when they wore stopped. isr. Boucicauls then went back to America, whre he hal, since remained. The defendant recently applied to Mr. Boucicault for hi% permission to perform the niece at Drury- lane, but did not obtain leave to do sio. N;twithstanding that, however, he had advertised the performance of the ,Slucugliraun at the Adelphi for Saturday November 18, and, as the copyright in it was of eat value, Mr. thouci. cault instructed this agents hr t ring this action to pre- vent the inteoded representation. The case was heard upon motion for an interloentorh incin before Vice-Chian- cellor lains, on th t of November a two days before the annouLnced revival at the Adelphi). His Lordship, in re- fusing the motion, was of opinior that as the play was first represented in New York there had been a "first publica- tion ont of Her mpjesrns Dominionsf" within than 1h sec- tioI of the Imternational Copyright Act, 7d and 8 Vic., cap. 12, so as to be fatal to the plaintiff's clainm His Lordship mainly relied upon the decision of Lord Hathorley when Vice-Ohancellor in the case of "D oucicault v. Delafeld" (1 Hem. ann Mil., e97), in which he bad refused an injunction against the performance at one of th Londonr theatres of the far-famed Colleen Baweun, whicb, as in the present case, had first been played Isa New York, on the ground that such performance at Nw York was a " publi- cation," which deprived the plaintiff of his right to procec- tiou. The qouestion, which was whether a firt representation of the play i fewYorkinvi a publication wlthin7and i a., cap. 12, sec. 19, tured upQn the constitution of the follow- ing Acts, the material sectons of vhich are here given By 3 and 4 WDllam IV., cap. 15 (comnly caled Sir Buliwr Lytton's Act), sec. 1, the author of any drauatic piepe composed and not printed or published by him' or h'is assignee, shall have as his own property the sole lebrty of representing or causingp to be. represented ix any part Of the 'United Kingdom, the Channel Zalnds, or the Britush dominions such production as aforesaid, net riorated and published by him or his assigne, and shall he a7emed and taken to be the proprietor thereof By the second sectioni, any person who durig the liberty given by the first section reprosents an author's work without his consent is liable to a penalty. BY 0 and h Vict., cap. 45 (the Copyright Amendment Act, 184), sec, 20, the term of copyright as provided thereby is applied to the liberty of representing dramatic pieces, "save and except that the first public representation or performance of any drematlo piece shal be deemed equivalent, in the conx- struction of thxis Act, to the first publicatioa of any hookd5 oy and 8 Viet,, a.1 *a n ct Law Relatin to International Co gh toe amend ithe nacted astioeows -"n Thatc o the ecthr o19aitn bec no that e authb ieOa'or or cns o? hany book nor the author orecomposer of any dramatic piece which shall after the pt sing of this Act he first 'published' oat of Her Mtaj esty's opominsonsp shall haive any copyright thertin respectively, or any exclusive right to the publio ropresentationi or performance thereof, otherwise then siuclz anyahy)s honmayibeco in entitled toa ndr this Act." 11r. GLASSI Q.C., and Mir. Rosyune for the plaintiff, ia support o? the appeal, contended upon a firat per. foranxce of a play abrord without circulation or sale of printed copies was not such a "pnblication " as to deprive the plaiotiff, who was admittedly thse anther of the play in que uton, of protection for Iiis copyuish therein lThe case was Corned by 3 and 4 lilliam IV , Ca. 15. se. 1, anud ote by the other stautes referredIto, d under tha sectioa a marked distinction was dmawn, in tmers almost retagnientic, between the act of representa- tion and that of ptrting and publication. Unless it was initended by the Legislature in passing 7 anda8 vie., cp. 12, indirectly to repeal the proviaions in favour of dra- matic authora contaened in 3 and 4 William IV. cap. 15, tha plaintiff' right under the latter statute remained un- afnected. It had beet more than once derided that t4e r e p res e nta t;i o o f ar p l u p o t heT s to a g w a s I I L n o t p u bls l c a - reiorred b, which evpressionwas meaotho pntg 3and distribu- tion lofordsale,and whenth term pubicatironwas used in 7eandViDg cap.i 1oul, se.19,It uappied bly tothe construe iona ofa that particulAct,on for the purpose of fixing the seriodifrom whichv the monopoy to rtepresentation should Mlr. Hraoorxs, Q.0. (Mr. A. A.. Terreli and ML Holmes Poulter with him), for the v efeldaut, contended that the case was governed by the decision of Lord Hatherley, in the exactly analogous ease relating to the Collecn Thcan, to the effect that ese 19 applied expressly to British sub- gects first publishing in a countr wth which no interua- hiscopyright esthed oratn d8 that t Wrepresentation ab,road tha tuhprtecinhdbe nn {Vafce byoand( ,ay 4or any sale of printed copies was a oslicantion ithn othehat , secton, e bywhich the author lost protta ection inslf this vcotry.cer n teqnt LordJusice asis culd ometo oether ooneluslon than that arrived at by VIce-Chancellor MalIns, who had felt himself bound by the decision of Lord wHatherley i " Boucicault v. Delaaleld " in 1863. TakIng sec. 19 of 7 and 8 'ia., capj. by itself, ther couA4 e Ino doubt whatever as to t meainng of the words" first published."' But then it was said that tq hold that the representation of a glay was a puxblication of it would bo, in etlect, repealing the provsion in favour of dramatlo authors contained in 3 and 4 WillIam IV., cap. 1D.gBut that Act was not thereby repealed, but reiained in force, exrept no far as it was interfared with for theo particular purposes of theInternational Copyright Act. That parti- cul p ose was to compel foreign countries to give to English dramatio authors rights similar to those which England was prepared to give to foreign authers ; irn othr words to treat the authior of a work first published aLbrosA in the same way as a foreign country treated an English author. If it had been intended to repeal the Act 3 and 4 Williamn IV., cap. 15, that intention would have been expressed in words. In thxe case of a. dramatic piece publication was made by means of representation'- and so in the case of a picture or piece of sculpture, publication was that process by which it was first miade the subject of sale or of use. It hatd been contended that " published " as to dramaatic representation had a peculiar meaning fixed upon it by previous decisions, and, accordingly, that munless the dramatic piece had been first "ptrinted " abroad there bad beenL no publication within the mecaning o,1f the statute. But there was really' no decision to tht effect ont the word "published" so far as ~it occured in this 'code of law ; and the cases referred to, which woro before the Act 3 and 4 WVil- li=n IV., cap, 15, dlid not afford any interpretation of the word " published" such as would enable the Court to apply toth bw~ord anything beyond the ordinary grammatical mieaning as it would be understood by aLny ordlinary Englishmnan reading the sectioni for the purpose of under- staniding what was the law as to international copyright, or by a foreigner who would read thi English language. Thley were, therefore, bound by the decision of Lord Hlatherloy, and the injunctionlhad been rightly refused by Vico-Chanecolor Mlllins. Lord Justieo llAoGALLrAY Was Of the same Opinion, thiouglihhehind felt considerable doubt on the subject. The plaintiff's catse was that he was entitled to be protocted In his copyriglht by the operation of 8 and 4 Wifllam IV., cap. 15, and that such protection had been 'in no w affected by5uand(isVie., cap. 43, or by7and8 Via., cap.!V.T"he do- f'ondaint, on thte ether hand, contendedathat thoeprovisions of 7 anid 8 Vic., cap. 12, sec 19, were imperative, and had the etfect of barring the plaintiff's claim. The language of that section taken by itself, was very clear, and the qusstionL Nvas reauced to what was the meaning of the words " first publishied." Now, the provi-ous Act, 3 and 4 William IV., caxp. 11, g-ave no indication of what was the meaning of the wvord "published," and the two cases referred to in support of theo platintifl's contention that mere representation on theo stage did not amount to publication of 2. dramnatic piece were both decided before the passing of the Act 3 anud 4 William IV., and therefore gave no precise Insight inito the meaning of that statute. His Lordlship, after nilsutly xamnin th prvisonsofthe several Acts refrre to sad tat t apeaed o hm,after considerable doubtand esittion tha secton 1 of and8 Vit., cap. 12, as mpeativ, ad dprivd te paintff f ay righb Lor Jutic Btgir sid ha cetailythe question upon tho statute could not be said to be easy. If the word " published " was to be read in the ordinary sense, then the plaintiff's case was directly within soo. 19. The ques- tion then was, whether it was to be construed in that sec- tion according to its ordinary meaning, or to be limited as proposod by the plaintiff. The subject mattor dealt with by the Act was dramatio composition, which was different from ordinary literary composition, inasmuch as it might bo made use of in two ways-either by printing and distributing the work as an ordinary written ComPosi- tion, or by means of acting it on tho stage of a thea- tre. If the dramatio author were an Englishman, he ad no doubt certain rights wre given to him by the sta- tut. 3 and 4 William .. cap. 1. I ho were a foreigner, no lights whatever were given to him by that statute, and therefore anybody in England might have acted in this eountry a foreizn piece which had been produced abroad by ' forelp author. The International Copyright Act was intended to deal with two clsses-i, with foreign authors ,who had hitherto enjoyed no protection in England; 2, 'With En hebs authors who first acted their piocs abroad. The Atde&ltot1only withforeign as well u British drnma- tic authora, but with several lcinds of tbins which weore in- cIudealnprint8 sculpture, musIcal ompositIons,&, Si. hich were included in lts protection. Section 19 sca perfectly general, and the wtords there used must have their ordinary meaninglt tn.them.mn?nots?0lL^e ~ ppled L o.-d =ie ~'hOll disued the i gdmatteron authors. To give it a double maeanlng-for that would in effctbe heresltof ths plaintiff's contautlru-would bea onable. If EFgish authors wi go abod wan thav cthei Plays repretnted for the fprat t*ne on a n stag thr must ber in the same position as a foreign author who a irs e prlsents his pa ihi' hod country. onCurrin ai he didgwineir othe ithe presentapelmst b e sd, withthet tMr. GGINS, Q.C., on behalf of Mr. Chatterton, desired to state that he had always been reay hand willing to pay the usual roYties, and that after the decision of Lord Hatherley in the Cotleen Bawns cse, he had made such pay- Ments to Mhr. Boucicault. Lord Justinto JaM&x-We have discued the msatter on a pure question of laws only. (SiUin5os ati Wcm inster, on Appwhte from dred Comtes re aws oifte dions triers the LobDa Courk , and, o ncf Lord Justice inAssWxnr and APm. The Court, as thus reconstituted-.the Lorcd Chef isbon having been withdrawn to sit In the Divisional Court- continued the hearing of appeal from the Common pleas Division. Tn our report of this age yesterday Lurd Justice Bran- hwell is represented as saying that he tiought the "proceed- ins frivolousf" and it is desired to explain that by this athLord Justice meant to te re ra s sien, noty the action iteelf tg ond ti's nrse a w it latiaoan for rto ques hich put to had le s to witnch s ?ro disputes, eneangntanmaopealwto thas C out. REAM"AS V. 5tETHcv3orrm This was the Action against t the well-known ue apert t in handwriting for aletged sianer uttered while he was in the witness-box against the plaintiff. Mr. netherelnft had, as an expert, given evidence in the Court of Lrobate on the trial of a case in which the genuineness of the signa- ture of the testator to a wil was in issue, attested by the present plaintiff, and he had pronounced it as his opinion that the signature was a forgery. The jury had fomnd in favour of the wiol, and the Judge of *he Probate Court made some strong observations on the presumption of Mr. Netherelift in setting up his opinion against the positive evidence of the witnessea to the signature. Mr. Nether- clift was soon afterwards a witness on an inquiry before a magistrate into a charge of forgery, and counsel asked him, in cross-examutiatiun, whether he had read these remarks of the Judge of the Probate Court, and, on his answering that he had, sat down. Mr. Nethorilift then said he wisbed to make a statement about the former case. The mnagis- trate said that he could not bear anything about a ease not before the Court, and tried to stop him, bus he went on to say, "I believe that ill to be a, rank forgery, and shall so bolievo to the day of my death." For this the witoess referred to brought this actioxi against Mlr. Netherelifb for slander. The defence sot up was that he was privileged or protected as a witness. The sotion was tried befori Lord Coleridge, who left these ques- tions to tlho jury iesL Were the words spoken by the defendant in goodL faith as a witness, or in answer to any quTestion put to him as a witiess? 2. Did he speuak them otherwise than as a witnesa, as a volunteer, and for his oiw purposes? 3. Were they spoken maliciously h The jury answered the first question i the negative dad the other two in the affirmative, and they found a verdict for the plaintiff for EX On an applica- tion to a Divisiond a Court of the Common Law Divisions to set aside the verdicn, the Court, constituted of two Judges-Lord Coleridge and Mr. Justice hrett-gave judg- nment for the defencant, on the grund that the words, .being spokn by the defendant as o witness whcie in the witness-box, wer. absolutely privilegedl or protected from liability to action. The judgment of the Court as delivered by Lord Coleridge -as based on the ground that, from the time of Lord Coke to the time of Lord Mansfield, and from the time of Lord Mlansfield to the presenLt time, It had beenx held that the words spoken by a witness asuch were citdte icethdec party wness cuns, tury, or udE, saorid Lord Mansfely, "cane thapt, to answegrda, ciitns,ly orpriminllye for words spoken ts o,ivicn"gI eis true,'sauhidies Lord C'eride, that Lord Jeustanand the present Lord Crhief Jdtie? ofdEngland f bad oxpressed opinonsto he ffet tat he ord ofLord Mansfield Were toner and that they wore disposed to hold a Jud liable for words spoken even in offce, if spoken in abuse of office, with express malice and without reason- able cause. Individually," said LorA Colorld5e, " I think there is a great deal to be said In favour of that view; hut a sories of authorities from the time of Lord Coke, and even before his time, have held the contrart, and thie bind me hrae. . . t he present question, continue Lord Colerild, "could not have arisen till of late years in the case o actual parties to proceedings, bocause they coulad speak only by pleading or by affidavit, or in conduct- ingltheir own cases so person ; but a long course of autho- rities have derided that no action of slander can be brought for sny statement by the parties in the conduct of the ease. . . .tAs to cousel, their privilege is not greater than that of the parties, and it may be lees, for it has never been dlecide that they would nthrite subject to action for words even spoken during the conduct of a case, if the wordst were irrelevant and malicious, which qualities are acndiust be uestions of proof ancd for the jury.", Theon Lord Coleridge, as to witnesses, cited a recent tdesion in the Court of Error in which false, slanderous, and msLious worcds in an affidavit were held not actionable, and the Court said,-" The rule is inflxhible that no aotlori will lie for wordsm spoken or writteu in the course of giving evidence ;"1 and his Lordship then cited the recent decision of 15 Judges in the Court of trror in Lord hokeby's case, that, "as regaras a witness, his priviuege for words spoken in giving evi- dence is absolute and un ualitfied " On these grounds and these authorities Lord Colri an d ind bMr. Justice Brett gaveudghmsel,t forithe defen t, ad ofrou,m that fudgment Mr. ontgn hamers Q.CMr.Jams Trr,andMr. 13. ay ere or he ppelant th plantif;er. agm'cnty, that Mr.s dwarld belarkto, aud Mr. Ahe wbuere After thte case had been fully stated, Mr. C1AanMBoRS proceeded to argue, for the plaintiff, that the action, upon the true view of the authorities, was maintainable. The merits of the cAse, he said, were cl3r with his client, the plaintiff, for the jury had found that t,e worcs were irrolerasut and spoken maliciously and voluntardiy, and not as a witnes, and t rd Coleridge, who tried the ease, concured in those indingso; and the Judges fad gien judgid _et for the defendant, not upon the mrt,but uo certain view of toea law, as giving an absole pret everything i said by a witness, which they cocivdtob so established by the dlecided eases thatr thade tova Suddo Bucoeti othe n th t thyere not at liberty to depart from.Bt i cn tendedthatthis view of the authorities was erroneous, and that, in truth the earler authorities had notb gone to that extent, and hhat the later authorities had proceeded upon a mistaken notion thsi they had. He wout on carefully to examine the authorities in order to establish this view, Is contention beimg tuat Words spoken by a witness, if irre- levant and spoeit voluntarily and maliciously, wore actionable. It was only, he insisted, words spoken "aoin the course of justice "which were protected from liability. The LoftD onsel, Jusho observed that perhaps the question might in such a case be this :-Did the witness Make the vstiement complained of for the purpose of doing the party complaining an injury, or was it made in his own vindication? Suppose, ffor instance a damathe question asked a Witness, and he, to vbndincitie a gainst the suggestions or insinuations of cross-examinilog counsel, made a statement in?urious to another man's charactor, not with the view of RoDnj the other an injury, but only in order to vindicaoe himel , it might he, subject, of course, to further argument, that this would be protected; but if he abued the opportunity afforded him as a witness in giviOg his evideneo and took advantage of it to say something in- jurious to another person, it might he beyond the privilege o of wituess . Mlr. cuxheuz said thoat sucb, in effect, was his argu- maent, which, he said, was sustained in this case by the fhdming of the jury, approved 'by the Judge. Tating that as the test, he conteznded that the privilege or Rrotection of a witness dlid not extend to the words complained of in the present case iad the impression on wthic the Court below had actea was founded on a miscenception of the ancient authoritief.? The LosEt, CHfEwn Tusmcm observed that, still, if this view, however erronaeous in its origin, bed been long main- tained and followed by a course of judicial decisions, it couild not he now overthrown. Mlr. CiAMramRs agreed to that, hot denied that there had been any such long course of judlicial decisions. There had been numerous dicta to that effect, he said, hut not Ijudicial decisions, enid he continued to examine the cases in oder to establish this. Alluding to the cognate case of privilge ofr counsel, he observed, with reference to the recet rlin oftheLor Chef aro inthe ease of Lewi v.Higins" tat o tougt terehad been a litle lipin hatcas inrulng hatthee asua absolute privle~ foreveythng soke in the character of coune, nd tat t mus b perinet ad relevant to theo The LoseD CB-mm JusTiCu observed that, supposing counsel went out of his way to utter calumnies wholly irrelevant to and quite remote from the case in hand-as if, ina cio ooods sold, he went out of his way to saytha th oposie prty30 years ago had been con- viced f frgry-t mghtbea question whether that was Mr.OxAmEn sad he contended that it would not 'be so, either in the ease of counsel or witness, anxd that in either case the words must be relevant and pertinent. The misconception of the law, he said, which had arisena had mainly arsn from Incorrect representations of theo effect of the authorities, which dlid not go to the extent spse,and it had never been decided that there was a prvimon tor what had bee spke ire Iay voluntarily, sod maliciousaldy hOen theother hand, ho said, scandalous aidavits wvere taken off the file of the Court. Lord Justice AXPwnrrr observed that he had certaily known this done. lr. CHAMBERS submitted It stronglysupported his rgu- ment thast irrelevnt and slanderous statements of witnesses were not protected. Coming to the recent case of Lord Rolkeby, which went from the Court of Error to the Housoe of Lords, where tire judgmenit in favour of Lord Rokeby was affirmed, be said it did not decide, as was supposed and stated in the head-note of the case, that "no actIon lies against a witness for what he says in giving evidence itfothus,Cou" of Justice," for the judgment qualified I thus,-" ^Provided it is relevant to the subject of inquiry." Thus, ho said, loose notions of the law had I arisen on the subject, which had miisled the Court below. The Judgo, in that case, had directed that the statemenat had reference to the subject of inquiry, and this was the ruling upheld, but the Judges had " gono a little beyond their tether," and had laid down the law far more widely than was required for the decision of the case before them, and had done sO on the supposed authority of a "long series of decisions," which did not in fact eist, herenot being a dingle decision to the extent supposed. The LOBD CErnr JusTIez observed that all thatwas w decided by that case was that what was said ia a military inquiry if relevant to tho inquiry, was protected. MIr. d.snsxiia -just so- that was what he contended and it decided no more tban that, and did not at all militate a73tnst his rument. It would be dangerous, he urged, to lay down the itmunity more broadly, and mak-e v, _ternn immsnisni fox slander. howextr 1(9lu,t.r marighti be. The policy of the law did not require this, for it wa funedn only oD;n ewht wasreS- ured for the administration of jutce. The jrW y here hd dfountd that theword, werer maliious, volunttuy, and The LosD a=rR3 JUMTI-They have not found that the words were not relevant; thai in mnost essential Mr. CTH BEA urged that this vas implied in the fnd- lug that the wordswere spoken voluntsrily and malicously. The LORD OEMm JuSrIOn said he was not sure of that, and proceeded to may,-Suppose the witnas is asked some- thg to disparage his testimony, wbicb would be relevant in this sense, that it might .ffect his credibility. As is ,would bo relevant to the counsel on one aide to pat a question tending to disparage the testimony of the wItness so it would be equally relevant to counsel on the other side to put questions tending to restore its crodibility. Now, suppose the question asked " Did yat read what Sir James Hannen said of you ?" ana then Rupjpose him asked, "Did be not say so and so to his prejudice as a witness, and the effect of his admitting this said would be to affect his credibility as a counsel on the other aide would be entitled to Lask, "'Did you, when you gave the evidence vhich led to these observations, bonestly belIeve in the trath of your statement r" and he were to answer i 1 did ;" and suppose him then Laked, " And do yon till beieve in the truth of your statement 1* and he were to answer, " I do." Those answers would certainly be relevant and pertinent. Now, suppoae further, that there was no counsel present to pretect he witness, or that counsel did not do so. nd suppoe the witness feeling himself placed in a most discreditsble positon by tho effect of the question jat put to him, were to make the same statements in hls own vindication would not they bo equally ptrtinent and relevant, seeing that their effect would be to restore his credibility a a witness ? Lord Justice BRAxwPnL-And let me supoose stil further, that the witness when admitting that Sir James Haanen had censured him as a rash and intemperate witness, had added1 " I have thought it over since, and I retain the same opuiion, and I state this because I was sworn to speak tne wvhole truth, and this Is part of the truth on the matter about which I have been uked."j Would not that have been pertinent ? If counsel ought to have been allowed to ark as to what Sir James Baunenl had said in a former suit, ought not the sitnes to have been allowed to add his explanation of it ? Mr. CUALEm9tS said he thought It was Irrelevant, and the putting of an irrelevant question did not justify irrelevant answers affecting third parties The magistrate: had told lr. Netherclift to be silent on the matter. The LonD CEMT Jus=R-There, I think, hie wa wrong, for it was, as I have already observod, very material whether or not the witness had been justly censured on a former occasion for his evidence. Lord Justice BP.&AcwXm.-The effect of the question was to insinuate that he had maisconducted himself on a former occasion. Lord Justice A3MELET.-And the magistrate, not having stopped the question or the answer, sought to ston the witneeses explanation. Surely he ought to havo stopped the question, or ought not to have stopped the elanatIon The LoRD CHIUt JusTicx-Suppose-a very improbable case, and quite impossible in the caso of the magistrate in this instance -suppose a magistrate desirous of favouring: one side, and supposo him allowing a question to a witness on the other inde tending to disparage him and destroy his credibility as a witness, and then supposo him stopping the witness when he seeks to make an explanation,-oould not tho witness insist upon being hoard in explanation for the vindication of his truth and character as a witness ? Mr. CHammERs said the answer was that in this case the jury had found that the statetnent made by the defendant was not bond ifldc; for it was volunteered, and was mali- dous, and not for his own vindication. The LOIRD 0mm' JUSTIC'r-I wonder what the jury meant by the word volunteer." What meaning had they in their mind when they said he " volunteered" the state- mnent Mr. CHA=r=s said he supposed they meant that what the defendant had said was sald voluntarily and unnecessarily, and not as a witness,; and ho submitted that their finding on that questiun was right, and that it could not be assumod at this stage that the questions were 'wrongly put, or that thoro haa been any misdirection. The LORD HXX? JUSTICE observed that if the Court saw that the right question had not ben put they might direct a new trial. Mr. M'IbIm'n.g, on behalf of Mlr. Netherclift, argued that the verdict was wrong, and that the judgment of the Court below, setting it aside,was righte The action, he contended, was not maintainable, for the words were spoken by his olient as witness, and were relevant; za as, therefor3, he had a legal right to utter themn, it dld not matter that the jury had, as he insisted, wrongly found that they were uttored maliciously and voluntarily. r. Nethereilft had a right to make the statement ha did, as it went to his credibility as a witness, and was moot relevant. Supposo a witness asked " WVere you indicted for perjury!" might be not add to his answer, " Yes, but I waa acquitted?" And in that view it would not matter that he was what the jury cled a"volunteer." If the magistrate, when the queston was put, had stopped the witness before he had answered at all, it would have been different; but ir. Netherclift was called upon aud compelled toanewer thatlSir James Hanuen had so spoken of him and yet was told that he must niot answer the imputation implied. The words of I Sir J. Haunen were severe no doubt, but, Mr. Nether- I clift thought, undeserved, ieeauso he had merely adherod to his own opinion as an expert. Sir James Hannen had censured lr. Netherchlft because he bad not taken into account the positive evidence of other wituesses. The LoRD C0T JusarTzc observed that an expert ought to give his evidence unbiased by the positive testimony, because it is given on the bandwriting slone. Lord Justice BRAmwmL-But it was wrong after the other witnesses had given their evidence, to decire that he still adhered to his opinion That he ought to be sorry for saying, whatever may happen in these proccedings. IThe Lon OER usTcz-No doubt; that is quite different from the part he originally took in giving his testimony, It vwas ansvwered to this that Mr. Netherelift had not heard the ovidence of the other witnesses, and that he had really only spoken of his own opinion as to the haudwriting. Uir N'b,Ysi proceeded to cite from a judgment of Chief Justice Erle in the Court of Error, in which he said that no such action had ever boen maintained against a witness. and that, as " for centuries" no such action had ever beep maintained, it showod the general consent of the Judges of this country that no such action was main table. The Lonn am m JurncL-'hat Is the decision of a Comrt of Error and binding upon us. Other recent eases were cited to the like effect. The LoRD C rnMm Juscz said he had certainly beon inclined to think that If the privilego was abusod it should ceass to be privilege, but ho was overwhelmed by authority to the ocontrary. The law, no doubt, had been so lsid down on the ground of publio policy, because persons would ba reluctant to come forward and give evidence if they were liable to actions. It was further submitted that the Judges and Law Lords in the recent case of Lord Rokeby had laid down the im- munity of a wituessfrom aotion as bsolute su lun- doubted. The LOitD CHs. Jus=oz observed that the law seemed to have been so understood by the Lord Chief Baron in the recent case of " Lewis v. Higgins." The case was adjourned. suPRm co TF JDICATuRR COURT OF APPFAT. Tfl- IA