First published in The Times, August 5, 1989

South Yorkshire police, in particular its senior officers involved in the planning and execution of the operation at Hillsborough, are criticized severely by Lord Justice Taylor. The failure of police control was the main reason for the disaster, he said.

He criticized both the inadequacy of the operational order for the match and the role and actions of individual officers on the day. The judge said 65 police officers gave oral evidence to the inquiry but that the quality of their evidence was in inverse proportion to their rank.

Many young constables, he said, were alert, intelligent and open. On the day, many strove heroically in ghastly circumstances, aggravated by hostility, to rescue victims. They inspired confidence and hope. ``By contrast, and with some notable exceptions, the senior officers in command were defensive and evasive witnesses. Their feelings of grief and sorrow were obvious and genuine.

Tragedy on the terraces

• 'Mayhem' after gate was opened

• 'We watched them die, innocent figures, lying prostrate and crushed on the green grass'

• Doctors attack 'total chaos' of rescue effort

Police in 'open gate' inquiry

• The man who opened the gate

• Force condemned for failing to avert turnstile disaster

• Senior officers were not willing to concede fault

Mother tells of losing husband and son as she witnessed crush on TV

• Names of the supporters who died are released

• Liverpool welcomes vindication of fans' behaviour

• Thatcher hears of heroic courage

Anfield Kop becomes silent focus of city's mourning

• Thousands at requiem mass as Liverpool mourns deaths

• Sombre lessons soccer failed to learn

``But, neither their handling of problems on the day nor their account of it in evidence showed the qualities of leadership to be expected.'' The judge said it was regrettable that at the hearing and in its submissions, South Yorkshire police were not prepared to concede they were at fault in any respect.

Under cross-examination, Chief Supt David Duckenfield, newly promoted and in charge of his first semi-final at Hillsborough, apologized for blaming the Liverpool supporters for causing the deaths. ``That apart, the police case was to blame the fans for being late and drunk and to blame the club for failing to monitor the pens. It was argued that the fatal crush was not caused by the influx through gate C but was due to the barrier 124a being defective. ``Such an unrealistic approach gives cause for anxiety as to whether lessons have been learnt. It would have been more seemly and encouraging for the future if responsibility had been faced.''

The operational order for the match left much unsaid with, for example, no specific deployment of officers to man perimeter gates and no detailing of the duties of mounted officers outside the Leppings Lane turnstiles. The order covering the previous year's semi-final was never substantially reviewed. The judge said Mr Duckenfield was promoted to take charge of the division covering Hillsborough only 21 days before the match; it might have been wiser to leave in charge the previous chief superintendent.

The officer was not informed of a crushing incident on the same terraces eight years earlier; he did not know the arrangements between the club and police for monitoring the terraces; and he did not tour the ground before approving the operational order. South Yorkshire Police had handled crowd problems sensitively and successfully at big football matches and in the strikes which beset the mining and steel industries. On April 15, however, policing broke down. Although there were other causes, the main reason for the disaster was the failure of police control.

The judge said that Mr Duckenfield leant heavily on the experience of one of his senior officers at the ground, Supt Bernard Murray. Between them, they misjudged the build-up at the Leppings Lane turnstiles and did little about it until they received the urgent request from Supt Roger Marshall to open gates to relieve a rapidly deteriorating situation. Inflexibly, they declined to postpone the kick-off.

Lord Justice Taylor then turned to the pivotal role of Mr Duckenfield. ``When Mr Marshall's request came, Mr Duckenfield's capacity to take decisions and give orders seemed to collapse. Having sanctioned, at last, the opening of the gates he failed to give necessary consequential orders or to exert any control when the disaster occurred.''

The inquiry was told that no orders were given to direct the inrush of fans away from the central tunnel, leading to the already crowded terraces, to areas of the ground where there was still space. ``He misinterpreted the emergence of fans from pens three and four. When he was unsure of the problem, he sent others down to `assess the situation' rather than descend to see for himself. He gave no information to the crowd.''

Mr Duckenfield also failed to tell his superior officer, an assistant chief constable, the truthful version of events until much later. ``The likeliest explanation of Mr Duckenfield's conduct is that he simply could not face the enormity of the decision to open the gates and all that flowed therefrom.''